Federalist paper 51
If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power.And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves.Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi.But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils.
As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.And it has been shown that the restraint would be salutary, at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate.We must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the community.This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption.It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser, than in the preceding instance.This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league.Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent.Author: James Madison To the People of the State of New York: THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money.Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times.
The Avalon Project : Federalist No 45Theseus first, and after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens.
In regard to the power of convening either house of the legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect to the Senate at least, we can readily discover a good reason for it.Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on parchment.Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of influence.The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors.
And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine.Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate terms.The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member.Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.The attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number of these instances.
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies.In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year.The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least delinquent States.The position is too absurd to merit a refutation, and yet this is precisely the position which those must establish who contend that the trial by juries in civil cases is abolished, because it is expressly provided for in cases of a criminal nature.The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws.The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously leveled.The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves.
With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union.Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government.They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans.The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources.The suffering States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain.Summary: James Madison begins his famous federalist paper by explaining that the purpose of this essay is to help the readers.This view of the subject will at once suggest to us the intimate connection between the duration of the executive magistrate in office and the stability of the system of administration.If the latter, in what relation will they stand to the national tribunals.The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or representative constitution, is a change of men.
One source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new government.Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States.Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State.They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.The Total Number of the House of Representatives From the New York Packet.An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction, that each, as far as possible, ought to depend on itself for its own preservation.The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered From the New York Packet.The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other.But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.But with regard to the federal House of Representatives, there is intended to be a general election of members once in two years.The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures.On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency.In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony.In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union.A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States.Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the government, was himself the chief magistrate of it.